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I. INTRODUCTION
The frequently lengthy process of a courtroom trial, with its rule-laden
formality, was historically the only available means of dispute resolution. To
move cases to resolution more quickly, private parties began to search for new
mechanisms.1 An alternative process developed, and some cases now move at a
faster pace through the use of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) processes.
Because one of the ADR processes-mediation-requires the active
participation of the parties in resolving their dispute, the view held by the lay
person about the legal system takes on an importance that did not exist
historically. For example, I have a friend who recently remarked, "The court is a
white man who goes to work and puts on a black robe." Absent reference to a
judge, this statement puts the jurisprudence of the country at issue and
communicates a core belief that is too critical to the success of ADR to be
ignored.
A view of the court system as white and male burdens the process at the
outset with perceived power imbalances. In ADR, where the parties are pivotal to
the outcome, power issues will arise more overtly and less implicitly than in the
classical litigation forum. In their participatory discussion, the parties will speak
from their personal backgrounds and experiences. For persons who, because of
their life experiences, feel they have little or no power, the mediation experience
will begin from the perspective of a skeptic. How the mediation experience ends
will result from a complex set of case-specific dynamics that are active within the
particular mediation.
The parties will bring their personal backgrounds and experiences to the
mediation forum expecting the jurisprudence of the specific location and culture
to be either helpful or damaging to their positions. My response to my friend is
that our jurisprudence is not as white and male as it was one hundred years ago;
it fortunately continues to shift and change, becoming multi-racial and including
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I See David B. Lipsky & Ronald L. Seeber, Top General Counsels Support ADR:
Fortune 1000 Lawyers Comment on its Status andFuture, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1999,
at 24, 26.
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women. A slight change in our jurisprudence carries significant weight in the
ADR process, because some resolutions are reached either by intensive use of
prevailing case precedent or with a knowing agreement to disregard case
precedent and customize a settlement outside the box of precedent.
This Commentary focuses on mediation as an ADR process and how
resolutions and the country's jurisprudence are impacted by individually held
myths.2 Many persons look at myth as stories without a factual base. However,
myth is used in this Commentary to mean institutionalized customs, traditions,
and mores that have become individually accepted as our own, which in turn
form our personal core values and beliefs. A myth can be worldwide, local to a
culture or a location, or personal to a family. In forming core values and beliefs,
a myth can be accepted or rejected by an individual. When enough individuals
reject a myth, a paradigm shift occurs, and a critical mass of the culture accepts a
different myth. A good example of myth and paradigm shift is laid out in this
Commentary through its discussion of sexual harassment and hostile working
environment. The sexual harassment issue also provides a good working
platform for discussion of the power issue in mediation.
In the academic field of jurisprudence, Pierre Schlag3 and Steven Winter4
write about a universal person they refer to as a constitutive "I." Schlag's
2 The terms "ADR" and "jurisprudence" recur in this Commentary. ADR is "the use of
private parties to resolve disputes that might otherwise be litigated. [The term] includes
various techniques of third-party assistance, including mediation, arbitration, fact finding,
mini-trials and ombudspersons." Id. at 24. The term jurisprudence is used in this
Commentary to mean a system of law that exists as the result of a gradual amalgamation of
myths, large and small, over the years.
3 See generally PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON (1998) [hereinafter
SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON] (examining contemporarynormative legal thought
from a different perspective than the norm); PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW:
MYSTICISM, FETISHING AND THE AMERICANLEGALMIND (1996) [hereinafter SCHLAG, LAYING
DOWN THE LAW] (providing a compilation of articles that analyze the legal thought process);
Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere To Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167 (1990) (examining
contemporary legal thought); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U.
PA. L. REv. 801 (1991) (tracing the role and effects of normative legal thought); Pierre
Schlag, The Problem ofthe Subject, 69 TEx. L. REv. 1627 (1991) (examining contemporary
normative legal thought).
4 See generally Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 639 (1990) (examining and dissecting Stanley Fish's legal views); Steven L. Winter,
Forward: On Building Houses, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1595 (1991) [hereinafter Winter, On
Building Houses] (focusing on the ever changing legal process); Steven L. Winter, An
Upside/Down View of the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, 69 TEX. L. REv. 1881 (1991)
[herinafter Winter, An Upside Down View] (describing how the legal process works with
"normative orientation" to shift with social changes).
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universal person is the "relatively autonomous self' that is always and only
relative to its culture.5 Winter argues that cultural norm and context form an "I"
who is always living in "normative precommitment. ''6 Winter uses the term to
refer to the always existing circumstance of cultural norms that precommit the
-r' to a position before the '" arrives on a scene.7 Taken together, this means
that as individuals, we act according to myths, that we have either accepted or
rejected. It naturally follows that when parties to litigation walk into a mediation
forum, they do not drop personal myths by which they live their lives. Without
the constraints of a presiding judge and courtroom formality, the parties can be
expected to verbalize positions that conform to underlying values and beliefs
structured by their myths, but that do not necessarily conform to case precedent.
My intent with this Commentary is to demonstrate myth as we might expect
its presence to be displayed in the mediation process. The Commentary also
explores how law-the jurisprudence specific to the case-can clash with the
desires of the parties born of their personalized backgrounds, their life
experiences, and their values. Said simply, the parties' desires are born of their
myths. Part II.A. briefly discusses mediation as a process and provides a thesis of
why it works. Bargaining markers are set out in Part ll.B. to establish the
concepts of consistency, custom, and tradition as the functional backdrop against
which bargaining and power issues are leveraged. Part LII addresses myth itself,
relates myth to the bargaining markers of Part II.B., and describes how the myth
itself becomes a marker in mediation. Part IV builds on Parts II and HI by
addressing the variables that appear in all cases and discussing how these
variables, the bargaining markers, and myth contribute to a case-specific fact
situation of sexual harassment. In using a case ultimately decided by the United
States Supreme Court, Part IV illustrates myth as a functional piece of the law
and asks how mediation might proceed to reach a resolution determined by the
parties themselves.
II. MEDIATION AS AN ADR PROCESS
Section A provides a basic description of the mediation process and a theory
of explaining mediation's success as a resolution process. Subsequently, section
B illustrates that markers of bargaining are directly connected to myth and can be
considered just another name for myth.
5 Pierre Schiag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case ofthe RelativelyAutonomous Self, 76 GEO. L. J.
37, 39-52 (1987).
6 Winter, On Building Houses, supra note 4, at 1610.
7 Id. at 1607.
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A. Mediation Works and Why
Bargaining can, and often does, involve only negotiations between lawyers.
However, mediation goes beyond these "lawyers only" bargaining sessions and
brings in a third party with no personal interest in the outcome of the case to
serve as a "neutral"--literally, a go-between for the parties. 8 The process
provides a forum for attempted settlement of the case by the parties with the
facilitation of a "neutral."9
Significantly, mediation is preferred to arbitration in most types of
disputes.' 0 In the initial stage of the mediation process, the neutral asks each
party to outline the fundamentals of his or her position with the other parties
present."I At a later stage in the process, the parties discuss their positions with
only the neutral present. 12 Outside the presence of other parties, confidential
information may well be revealed to the neutral. 13 The neutral discusses the case
with one party and subsequently with the other, perhaps over a period of hours,
8 See MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard II (American
Arbitration Association et. al. 1999)
9 "While there is widespread use of the whole gamut of techniques, it is clear that the
corporate view of ADR is primarily limited to their experiences with meditation and
arbitration." Lipsky & Seeber, supra note 1, at 24.
Corporate policy toward the use of ADR also varies by type of dispute. For example:
There is widespread use of both mediation (78 percent) and arbitration (85
percent) in commercial disputes.
There is also extensive use of mediation (79 percent) and arbitration (62 percent)
in employment disputes.
There is limited use of ADR in corporate finance, financial reorganization, and
workout disputes (8 to 13 percent).
Id. at 26.
10 Id. at 24-26.
11 This session is called a "joint caucus." DICTIONARY OF CONFLICTRESOLLUTION 69-71
(Douglas H. Yarn ed., 1999).
12 This session is called an "individual caucus." Id.; JAMES J. ALFINI ETAL., MEDIATION
THEORY AND PRACTICE 131-33 (2000).
13 DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 11, at 69-71; ALFINI ET. AL., supra
note 12, at 131-33.
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days, or weeks, 14 until a settlement is reached, or the neutral and the parties agree
that they have reached an impasse.
15
It is recognized that both state and federal courts are embracing ADR with
unprecedented enthusiasm and frequency, 16 One might think that cases will
never settle or that all cases will settle with a tilt to the party walking into the
mediation holding the most power, often thought of as the party with the "bigger
bucks." However, there seems to be another force present that operates to bring
about resolution of a legal dispute.
Thoughtful mediation theorists and practitioners have given much
consideration to identifying mediation's unique powers. In their comments, two
points consistently are expressed regarding the capacities of the mediation
process.
The first special power of mediation, and what some call "[t]he overriding
feature and... value of mediation," is that "it is a consensual process that
seeks self-determined resolutions." Mediation places the substantive outcome
of the dispute within the control and determination of the parties themselves; it
frees them from relying on or being subjected to the opinions and standards of
outside "higher authorities," legal or otherwise. 17
The value of this "consensual, self-determined resolution" is surely more
than a dialogue wherein the parties merely parrot substantive law to each other;
the value, I believe, rests in the parties' ability to access their personal norms and
14 The neutral's movement back and forth to each party is often referred to as shuttle
diplomacy. DIcIoNARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, supra note 11, at 395-96.
15 An impasse can sometimes occur after months ofmediated negotiation. For example,
the federal government's anti-trust litigation against Microsoft failed to settle after four
months of work with a mediator. For media accounts, see generally Lee Gomes, After the
Verdict, Companies Consider the Impact, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4,2000, at A 16; Michael Orey
et al., Courtroom Battles Will Continue But Time Is on Microsoft's Side, Apr. 4, 2000, at
A16; States, Feds Trying to Settle Differences, ATLANTA J. & CONsTrLION, Apr. 4,2000,
at 5C; John R. Wilke & Rebecca Buckman, Microsoft Settlement Efforts Collapse, WALLST.
J., Apr. 3, 2000, at A3.
16 HarryN. Mazadoorian, BuildingAn ADR Program: What Works, What Doesn't, Bus.
L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 37, 40.
17 Robert A. Baruch Bush, Efficiency and Protection, or Empowerment and
Recognition?: The Mediator's Role and Ethical Standards in Mediation, 41 FLA. L. REV.
253, 267 (1989) (citations omitted).
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customs, their highly individualized personal myths, and, based on those myths,
to speak to components of the case they value most highly.
The second special power of mediation was described classically by
Professor Lon Fuller:
'The central quality of mediation [is] its capacity to reorient the parties to
each other... by helping them to achieve a new and shared perception of their
relationship, a perception that will redirect their attitudes and dispositions
toward one another."'. . . Others also have stressed this special power of
mediation to 'humanize' us to one another, to translate between us, and to help
us recognize each other as fellows, even when we are in conflict.18
Robert A. Baruch Bush refers to this humanization aspect of mediation as the
"recognition function of mediation."' 19
The litigation process as we know it is not designed to further the
relationship of the disputing parties. The litigation process is designed to end the
dispute without regard to continuing the relationship. It is no wonder that
mediation is an efficient process of dispute resolution, which leaves clients with
a greater sense of satisfaction. Mediation gives the parties an opportunity to
discount the "law" and formulate a nexus between the settlement agreement
reached and their personal myths that are foundational to their in-court and out-
of-court behavior. The parties can see and feel some of their everyday reality in
the settlement. 20 This discounting of the law to resolve disputes in favor of self-
determined resolutions serves as a highly active agent of resolution. Encouraging
lawyers to give mediation a try, Jeffery Kichaven observes that in litigation
where clients are not allowed to voice their personal perspective about the case
and verbalize their feelings concerning the matter, they "are left frustrated,
whether or not they win on the merits of the legal case. '21 Kichaven further
explains,
These clients are likely to remember the cost, the delay and the
inconvenience of litigation more than their victory, which they see as
incomplete.... By contrast, in mediation the lawyer can permit the client to
talk about [his or her personal perspective], whether or not relevant to the
18 Id. at 269-70 (citations omitted) (quoting Lon Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and
Functions, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 305, 325 (1971)).
19 Id. at 270.
20 KATHERINE V.W. STONE, PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION 19-20 (2000).
21 Jeffrey G. Kichaven, Mediation's Not a Four-Letter Word: It Can Work in Your
Business Case, Bus. L. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 18, 20.
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issues in the pleadings... [W]herever the discussion takes place, the more
frank it is,... the more sincerely satisfied the client is likely to feel with the
result and the process .... 22
This concept of allowing the party to completely tell a story is an important
concept to capture in mediation. In thinking through the reason for the client's
dissatisfaction with the legal process, it is likely that the dissatisfaction in some
portion always stems from the absence of the client's personal perspective in
traditional litigation.2 3 For example, the human side of the story that is not being
told invariably contains information founded on and legitimated by a myth left
invalidated by the evidentiary rulings. Mediation works, because parties in
settled resolutions can leave the conference table feeling that they were heard.
Specifically, mediation allows the parties the chance to tell their stories even if
some pieces of the stories would be considered immaterial, irrelevant, and
hearsay in a courtroom.
B. Bargaining Markers
Parties to litigation will not forego bargaining simply because the case is in
mediation. Bargaining tactics and strategies will be used in the mediation
process. The role of the mediator entails moving parties away from unrealistic
expectations, helping parties shape a more realistic evaluation of the case, and
recognizing tactics and strategies for what they are.24 Once the individual caucus
begins, it is likely that each party will be more forthcoming with the mediator
about expectations and will have a more realistic valuation of the case.
2 5
When money is the issue, the standards and norms of an industry carry
significant weight in courtroom litigation.26 We bring these standards into the
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 For a discussion of the role played by party expectations see Leandra Lederman,
Which Cases Go to Trial?: An Empirical Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, 49 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 315, 333-34 (1999).
25 ALFINI ET. AL., supra note 12, at 131-34
26 Richard Shell provides the following example:
Global financial markets set interest rates for borrowing money. Used-car buyers
consult a buying guide for average car prices-then negotiate final prices based on
factors such as the actual condition of the car, the buyer's budget, and the seller's need
for cash. Real estate brokers talk about "comparable transactions." And investment
bankers argue over the true value of a business based on discounted cash flows and
earnings multiples.
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trial process of resolving disputes by calling "expert witnesses" to testify and
address what is customary in the industry. In other words, experts address
customs and traditions, which are myth. Outside of the trial process, however,
mediation enables the parties to use
fancy terms and complex analyses [as] nothing more or less than techniques
that help buyers and sellers form opinions [about outcome]. These
standards... bracket the bargaining zone and permit all participants to talk
about their preferred end of the range without appearing, at least in their own
eyes, to be unreasonable. 27
Nonetheless, if these bracket standards disempower one of the parties
inordinately, the party will not see or hear his or her preferred individualized
myth and will balk at accepting the standard as legitimate for the party's specific
case. Richard Shell's thesis is that "normative leverage" in negotiation is gained
from the appearance that one's bargaining demands are consistent with the norms
of the industry.28 "You maximize your normative leverage when the standards,
norms, and themes you assert are ones the otherparty views as legitimate and
relevant to the resolution ofyour differences.' '29
Notice that it is consistency that provides the comfort. 30 When the other
party views a position as consistent with agreed-upon norms, there will be no
feelings of disempowerment. This is "normative precommitment"31 set in motion
by some then-existing, perhaps now unremembered, myth. "Standards and norms
rely on the consistency principle for their power in negotiation. But some
standards and norms are more powerful than others, especially in market
transactions. The strongest market standards act as anchors or focal points in
bargaining." 32 These anchor standards and norms discussed by Shell are
outgrowths of custom and tradition that themselves evolved from myth. They are
the deeply-entrenched norms of a culture that should be considered as life-
defining norms from which individuals seldom stray. Thus, the standard rises to
the bargaining marker level of anchor-a standard of non-negotiability. Lawyers
accept case precedent as institutionalized bargaining standards, the strongest of
G. RICHARD SHELL, BARGAINING FOR ADVANTAGE: NEGOTIATION STRATEGIES FOR
REASONABLE PEOPLE 41 (1999).
2 7 Id.
28 SHELL, supra note 26, at 42-43. "Normative leverage is the skillful use of standards,
norms, and coherent positioning to gain advantage or protect a position." Id. at 43.
29 Id.
30 Winter, On Building Houses, supra note 4, at 1620-23.
31 Id. at 1610.
32 SHELL, supra note 26, at 49.
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market standards. In Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, a seminal article on
the influence of the law in bargaining in divorce cases, the writers discuss
substantive law's impact on settlement. 33 The term "shadow" is used to bring up
the visual image in the reader's mind of the not-to-be-forgotten "law" at the
bargaining table.
34
In mediation, using precedent as the controlling law of the case could keep
bargaining inside "the box." "A feeling arises that it is slightly insulting or
presumptuous to negotiate a variance from the standard. '35 The "law" of
precedent certainly carries power and the ability to tilt the table in favor of its
proponent.36 "But often that is not enough. A purely legal discussion frequently
does not permit the clients to deal with... 'the rest of the story'. 37 A mediator
likely pushes the parties further because "this unspoken aspect, [the unspoken
myth] that the drafter of pleadings had to leave outside the courthouse, may be
centrally important to the clients and may need to be acknowledged before a
more rational discussion of the settlement of the lawsuit can take place." 38
Mediation successfully moves the parties out of the law's shadow, out of the
precedent box, and into the parties' self-determined resolutions, because "[m]ost
market standards are not so preemptive. Instead, they serve as range finders,
bargaining devices that bracket the bargaining zone within which parties can
haggle to settle an issue."
39
"Good" mediators are "good" negotiators. 40 In BargainingforAdvantage,
4 1
Shell explains that both effective negotiators and effective mediators draw from a
wide range of talents.42
33 Robert Mnookin & Lewis Komhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The
Case ofDivorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
34 Id.
35 SHELL, supra note 26, at 50.
36 DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER As NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAN 249-58 (1986).
37 Kichaven, supra note 21, at 20.
38 Id.
39 SHELL, supra note 26, at 49.
40 This is speculation on my part gleaned from having served as a mediator in diverse
settings.
41 SHELL, supra note 26.
42 Id. at 78.
From effective leaders they borrow the habit of committing themselves to specific,
ambitious goals. From good advocates they get the skill of developing arguments based
on standards and norms. From effective salespeople, they acquire the gift of valuing
relationships and seeing the world as the person they are trying to influence sees it.
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Mediators utilize all of the skills of a good negotiator and facilitate the most
difficult task of all-seeing the situation through the lens of the other party.43
The task of the mediator is to get the parties beyond their "partisan perceptions"
of how their position fits a bargaining marker or standard and into the realm of
perception of the other party.44 If seeing clearly through the lens of the other
party proves to be impossible, at a minimum, the parties with the facilitation of a
mediator begin to see the litigation as it might be seen by a fact-finder-not
altogether skewed in favor of one party or the other.45
Sometimes the snag between the parties is not money. For example, Shell
writes, "Experienced negotiators often report that price can be a relatively easy
term to resolve compared with less obvious but more explosive issues such as
control, turf, ego, and reputation." 46 When the issue is not money---"turf, ego,
control, and reputation" symbolize outward manifestations of a value and belief
system. These other-than-money issues also symbolize overt power displays. For
example, parties may state that "justice demands" or "equality requires" a
Research suggests that the ability to understand your bargaining opponent's perspective
may be the most critical of these skills and one of the hardest to use in practice.
Id.
Contrarily, seeing the world through the lens of one's cumulative personal experience is
ordinary human behavior that "negotiation theorists call partisan perceptions." Id. at 78.
43 Id.
44 In the anti-trust litigation brought by the United States Justice Department against
Microsoft Corporation, moving Bill Gates to become willing to "unbundle" its Explorer
Browser from its Windows Software, over the four months of mediation, was itself a
Herculean task for the mediator, Judge Richard Posner. Wilke & Buckman, supra note 15 at
A3. Without knowing with certainty that the government was willing to trade breakup of the
company for an unbundling of software, a close read ofthe remarks the mediator made in his
referral of the case back to the trial judge seems to indicate that the trade was on the table.
The move of the government to a "no breakup" posture was also a major task for the
mediator. When asked by the judge to submit its proposed remedy for Microsoft's antitrust
violations, the government, however, proposed a break up of the corporation into two
companies. Wilke & Buckman, supra note 15, at A3.
45 SHELL, supra note 26, at 63.
46 Id. at 30.
In the legendary fight over RJR Nabisco chronicled in Barbarians at the
Gate... a multibillion-dollar bid from one of Henry Kravis's rivals for RJR collapsed
when two major investment banking firms-Drexel Burnham Lambert and Salomon
Brothers-could not agree on which firm's name would appear on the left-hand side of
the Wall Street Journal ad announcing the financing. of the transaction. The position of
the firm's name in the ad would signal to the financial community which of the two
banks was the "lead bank" in the deal and neither would accept second place status.
Id. at 30-31 (citing BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARiANs AT THE GATE: THE
FALL OF RJR NABISCO 30-31 (1990)).
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specific outcome.47 These phrases are markers of ego and reputation
involvement. The parties within the mediation forum who haggle within a
bargaining zone carry with them their values and beliefs and all else which
makes them human. With ego and reputation involved and turf and power at
stake, trust might well be non-existent.48 Mediators diminish the need for trust
between the parties during the dispute resolution process. The mediator becomes
a repository for trust and can gently nudge the parties away from bargaining
markers into a range of options that satisfy each party's interests.49 The mediator
can also work to assuage bruised egos and create options of value that are
acceptable substitutes for relinquished turf.50 The mediator addresses the value,
myth-laden statements of justice and equality, -ego, and reputation bargaining
markers. 51
III. MEDIATION INSIDE THE MYTH EXPERIENCE
A. Myth
This part describes the birth of a myth and the paradigm shift that can occur
in a culture when the "new" custom is widely accepted. This part also relates
myth to the bargaining markers described in Part II.B. and demonstrates a myth
as an active participant inside mediation.
"[Myths are our self-interpretation of our inner selves in relation to the
outside world. They are narrations by which our society is unified. Myths are
essential to the process of keeping our souls alive and bringing us new meaning
in a difficult and often meaningless world."
52
Myth-inspired customs and traditions in turn inspire the values that we learn
and inculcate into our belief systems. 53 Which comes first, the custom and
tradition or the myth? Much like the chicken-or-the-egg question, this myth
query cannot be answered, because we cannot go back to the beginning of time.
It is logical to reason that a happenstance event became a custom, and the custom
repeated itself enough to become a tradition. The custom likely became such,
47 See ScHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON, supra note 3, at 135-40.
48 "At the core of human relationships is a fragile interpersonal dynamic: trust. With
trust, deals get done. Without it, deals are harder to negotiate, more difficult to implement,
and vulnerable to changing incentives and circumstances." SHELL, supra note 24, at 59.
49 ALFINI ET AL,., supra note 12, at 128-31.
50 Id.
51 SHELL, supra note 26, at 58-88.
52 RLLO MAY, THE CRY FOR MYTH 20 (1991).
53 Id. at 30-49.
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because it contained some structure for a situation that would have otherwise
been chaotic, confusing, or conflicting. With a custom to rely upon, individuals
for a moment knew the comfort of exactly what they were to do, how to act, and
what could be expected of others.54 It is at this juncture of relying on custom to
anticipate actions that the nexus of myth and bargaining markers become evident.
The description of myth as narrations by which society is unified also describes a
bracket standard and an anchor standard. Too much disruption of a standard that
is usually relied upon challenges the other party to examine the underlying value
the party places on the standard. If the myth upon which the value is based flexes
easily, the party will negotiate the standard. If the myth that forms the basis of
the value is deeply entrenched and life-defining, the party will not budge on the
standard-the party will choose to litigate because of the perceived importance
of the principle. Knowing the controlling myth enables the party to know the
bargaining range.
All that needs to happen for a myth to exist is for a piece of the story to be
thrust into the spotlight, and the value, almost automatically, gains complete
recognition of meaning-not necessarily agreement-among persons within the
listening audience. Today, the Civil Rights Movement story in the United States
is a myth of world-wide scope. Rosa Parks 55 is an archetype, and the Civil
Rights Movement in its scope clearly provides a narration by which some of
United States society is unified. This Movement disrupted custom and traditions
about segregation. The anchor standards to which Shell referred were
challenged. 56 Narrations of segregated society were erased. An underlying myth
of "better than" and "lesser than" was ripped to shreds in bombing, murders, and
jailed heroes. So deep and complete was the rip, the country experienced a
paradigm shift with a new myth about civil rights. Values based on race shifted
in a critical mass. The Civil Rights Movement fits perfectly with Rollo May's
definition of myth--"a way of making sense in a senseless world."' 57 Rights born
of disrupted narrations have now become the anchor standards described by
Shell.58 Were one of these rights challenged in a mediation, the party relying on
the norm in question would feel the inordinate disempowerment mentioned
earlier in Part II.B. of this Commentary.
54 If you insert "law" for the word "custom" in this sentence, you could be describing
parties in a courtroom process.
55 See generally DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, ROSA PARKS (2000).
56 SHELL, supra note 26, at 49.
57 MAY, supra note 52, at 15.
58 SHELL, supra note 26, at 49.
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This is a complete picture of how myth is born and later goes into the
mediation forum as a life-defining value. Thus, the picture reveals the ongoing
presence of myth within mediation.
J. C. Smith and David N. Weisstub in The Western Idea of Law59 give an
account of the myth-law relationship. The authors claim that, although lawyers
are likely to use the word "myth" to mean a story that is untrue, and while in
contemporary legal systems the term itself is not often used, "it is a fact of history
that law emerged from mythology and was at one time doubtlessly intertwined
with mythopoeic conceptions of the universe. '60 In claiming that myth is but
human effort to organize existence into stories that are less threatening than the
perceived chaos that surrounds them,61 Smith and Weisstub argue that through
establishing cultural beliefs and value systems, myths become the mother of
law. 62 Therefore, the authors argue, it follows that "law is a deeply human
product that is inextricably bound up with, and unavoidably contingent upon,
wider cultural forms. '63
In the authors' discussion of values, they put forward the following
argument:
Myth, through its offspring, law, is the most powerful statement of values
to which any society commits itself. Law, furthermore, is the most conservative
statement of these values, bearing an intimate relationship to the existing power
structure. In all cultures the resolution of conflict and law, as the embodiment
of systematic principles around which authority is organized, may be seen as
the rationalizing process according to which obedience and respect for
hierarchy are developed. Myth, in fumctional terms, is a pragmatic reaction to
the resolution of problems which affect the individual in the social
environment; it legitimates institutions and their rituals.
64
In functional terms this is an excellent definition of mediation itself.
The argument of myth's inextricable relationship with the law brings to the
forefront a discussion of a culture's values and how various values come together
to form standards and norms that become law. One author says the following in a
comment on values: "Values are grounds to the extent that they are shared within
a community and to the extent that they establish the shared identities and self-
59 THE WEsTERN IDEA OF LAW (J.C. Smith & David M. Weisstub eds., 1983).
60 Id. at 119.
•61 Id.
62 Id. at 120.
63 Id.
64 Id.
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definitions that make dialogue and deliberation possible." 65 Shared identities and
self-definitions exist as outward manifestations of myth. These shared identities
are traceable to Smith and Weisstub's myth in functional terms-pragmatic
reactions to resolutions of problems which affect the individual in the social
environment.
66
The institutions and rituals grow and develop over time, become law, and
contrary to Smith and Weisstub who say that law bears "an intimate relationship
to the existing power structure," 67 it can easily be said that these institutions and
rituals form the power structure and become themselves the embodiment of the
culture's power structure. Said differently, rituals are the law, and the law is an
amalgamation of myths. As clients and lawyers enter mediation, values and their
underlying myths will drive the bargaining process. As any singular piece of the
sought-after agreement falls into place at the table, although a bargaining marker,
if it is out of harmony with the customs and traditions of the clients or their
lawyers, discomfort results and the individualized composite of myth will
demand time for discussion and space for inclusion in the agreement. "The
contrast is between value-laden, abstract formulation of... rights, and fact-
driven, pragmatic decisions about the remediation of these rights." 68
IV. CASE SETTLEMENT: VARIABLES THAT INFLUENCE RESOLUTION
Variables, both general and case specific, are present in all cases. Section A
briefly touches upon an empirical study of these variables. Section B illustrates
Parts II and I at work in a specific case of sexual harassment.
A. General Variables That Influence Resolution
The discussion of general variables will provide helpful information on
aspects of all cases that facilitate or hinder case settlement. It is useful to
understand that the variables are always present, because a shift in one can either
create or hinder resolution. A mediator must remain mindful of the variables as
much as being aware of bargaining tactics and strategies being used by the
parties.
65 SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 44-45.
66 THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW, supra note 59, at 120.
67 Id.
68 Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 COLUM. L.
REv. 857, 869 (1999).
[Vol. 17:1 2001]
ADR, JURISPRUDENCE, AND MYTH
One author broadly states that"[t]he process that determines whether and
when a legal dispute will settle has two elements: evaluation and bargaining."
69
Moving from the broad to the specific, we can identify specific variables
independently affecting the power of the parties and leading to resolution of a
dispute.70 In an empirical study on settlement probability, specific variables were
found to be statistically and independently "significant in predicting an increased
likelihood that a case would go to trial. '71 The study looked at nine variables and
determined that five were the most compelling: appeals, stakes, judgetype,
decade, and background.72
The more one understands the study, the more one understands that the five
specifics can be collapsed into two, judgetype and stakes, which carry more
weight than any other.73 Decade and background, as variables, came to be used
as predictors of the type of judge one could expect (i.e., an activist with a "hands
on" participation in encouraging settlement discussions, or one who allows the
parties to go their own way74 with settlement discussions or none).75 Stakes,
influenced by the likelihood of appeal, played a major role in determining the
risk aversion of either party.
76
Background, as a variable, simply increased or decreased the likelihood that
the judge would be an activist. In addressing the judgetype variable as the most
significant, the study concludes,
Overall, the importance of the judge variables indicate that judges affect
which cases settle. Activist judges may assist the parties or their attorneys in
overcoming some barriers to settlement. It is possible, for example, that activist
judges give parties more information about the likely outcome at trial, or
discourage 'optimism,' which reduces parties' estimation errors, or helps
parties avoid strategic behavior or lawyer-client agency problems. 77
69 Stephen M. Bundy, Commentary on "Understanding Pennzoil v. Texaco": Rational
Bargaining and Agency Problems, 75 VA. L. Rv. 335, 337 (1989).
70 See Lederman, supra note 24, at 328.
71 Id. at 332. "Although the specific results of this study are not necessarily
generalizable outside of Tax Court, the insights into the applicability of the leading theories
on suit and settlement should be." Id. at 343.
72 The study also looked at four additional variables: party, taxpayer, region, and
counsel. Id. at 328.
73 See id. at 333-41.
74 See id. at 336-37.
75 See id.
7 6 Id. at 333-34.
77 Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
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Regardless of whether the judge is an activist, he or she will have a functional
myth regarding whether to be a "hands on" or "hands off judge."
The study directs the reader's attention to the "stakes" variable with the
statement that "higher stakes cases were much more likely to go to trial. '78 In any
discussion of stakes, risk aversion79 of the parties must be considered one of the
pivotal issues.80 Directly impacting risk aversion for any party are outcome
expectations. 81 When the parties widely diverge in their expectations about the
outcome of the case, they fail to create a settlement range.82 It is the occurrence
of such a divergence that makes the case likely to go to trial.83 The variable
study, as it concerns stakes, concludes, "In sum, the results tend to support the
importance of information in parties' formation of expectations about the likely
outcome at trial. The stakes variable supports the importance of divergent
expectations as possible causes of trials."' 84 It is here, as observers, that we can
see that the management of party expectations by an activist judge minimizes
78 Id. at 333.
79 "Risk aversion" is a phrase of art used by negotiation theorists to capture in two
words the amount of damage a party believes it will suffer if the outcome of a case goes
against them. High risk aversion is a factor that will push a party to settle. An example would
be negative publicity in the area of public safety for a corporation that manufactures tires for
cars. When a party believes that its damage will be minimal upon a loss, risk aversion is low
and the party is not as likely to settle. Risk aversion is one of the factors that would be
considered under the category of evaluation in Bundy's theory. See id. at 338.
80 Professor Leandra Lederman, in her article, Which Cases Go To Trial?: An Empirical
Study of Predictors of Failure to Settle, stated,
If risk aversion increased with the stakes involved, this would suggest that higher
stakes cases settle disproportionately, a result which in fact did not occur. On the other
hand, optimism models and asymmetric information models, both of which are models
based on parties' "divergent expectations" about trial outcomes, postulate that parties
fail to settle when their estimates of the expected outcome of a trial differ to such an
extent as to preclude a settlement range, that is, a difference of greater than or equal to
the sum of the parties' litigation costs. Divergent expectations theories suggest that
cases with higher stakes may be more difficult to settle (assuming litigation costs
remain fixed) because the same difference in opinion translates into a larger difference
in the expected outcome of the case. The results for STAKES supports divergent
expectations theory and the importance of estimation errors to the settlement/trial
decision. The results may reflect that litigation costs do not rise proportionately to the
stakes, thus magnifying the effects of estimation differences at higher stakes levels.
Lederman, supra note 24, at 333-34 (citations omitted).
81 For example, in the antitrust litigation the federal government brought against the
Microsoft Corporation, stakes were high.
82 Lederman, supra note 24, at 333-34 (citations omitted).
83 Id.
84 Lederman, supra note 24, at 341.
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divergent expectations and can alter strategic behavior. Thus, we see how the
judge variable and the stakes variable either intercept and give rise to a synergy
that is more likely to push a case to settlement or intercept with no impact,
because the judge is "hands off," and the parties are left with divergent
expectations.
85
The trial predictors bring concrete specifics to the theoretical models of suit
and settlement by directing our attention to the discrete segments of the
evaluation component of case settlement. 86 The predictors confirm the
significance of outcome expectation that is informed by as much gathered
information as possible about the facts of the case.87 The predictors also reflect
the judge's influence on the stakes variable, party estimates, and strategic
behavior.
88
Notwithstanding the backdrop of an activist judge, stakes and the importance
of outcome expectation seemingly make, break, or significantly lower settlement
possibility.89 Outcome expectation in high stakes litigation is evaluative, founded
largely on case precedent and that which is customary in the industry. The
bargaining aspect of litigation is founded largely on myth and issues other than
money-power, ego, control, turf, and the like. For example, a client may ask,
"What exactly will happen to my reputation if I settle or fail to settle?" A further
consideration is the parties' risk aversion.90 In mediation, developing remedies is
a matter, sometimes not routine, of making judgments about achieving a desired
end-judgments politically influenced by myth and resulting value systems.91
The nature of the remedy may shape the right and the definition of a right may
effectively incorporate a remedy.
92
This is especially true with respect to outcome expectations. A settlement
range can be reached on the basis of agreement around objective number
crunching. A settlement range is merely an area that melds within each party's
85 Within the practicing bar, it is not unusual for lawyers to "research" the judge to
learn of prior rulings and the proclivities of the specific judge. In addition to activism, a
representation of ajudge as "liberal" or "conservative" also weighs in on expected outcomes,
inclination to settle, and "strategic behavior." Id.' "The APPEALS variable results also
suggest thatthe parties settle early in cases in which theyhave similar expectations about the
outcome." Id.
86 Lederman, supra note 24, at 336-37.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 337.
89 Id. at 341
90 See source cited supra note 80.
91 THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW, supra note 59, at 926.
92 Id.
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outcome expectation, a spectrum of acceptable resolution. Within the range,
numbers may overlap and desirable options may converge. Outcome expectation
is less clear, and, in fact, is the point where the parties can totally diverge on
numbers within the spectrum. Inside the numbers, bargaining will take on the
values and egos of the parties. At the moment we become cognizant of the egos
at the bargaining table, we must simultaneously recognize that myth is present.
Myth, reputation, and ego begin to show at the bargaining table in the degree of
client satisfaction with the agreement that is beginning to take shape. A myth left
out of pleadings, may need to be acknowledged in mediation before a more
rational discussion 93 can proceed.
B. Sexual Harassment and Mediation
The focus of this section is on the Supreme Court's assessment of hostile
working environment in sexual harassment litigation, how this assessment
mirrors a definition of myth, and how the standards laid out by the Court will
become bargaining markers for mediated resolutions. Finally, the section looks at
how a case with a sexual harassment issue might be mediated.
A case with a sexual harassment allegation is front-loaded with cultural
myths of sexuality, power, and the workplace. The Supreme Court said as much
in its Faragher v. City of Boca Raton94 decision, although the decision does not
specifically refer to employee behavior as a ritual of myth. In Faragher, the
Court recognized sexual harassment as a workplace plague, stating, "It is by now
well recognized that hostile environment sexual harassment by supervisors (and
for that matter, co-employees) is a persistent problem in the workplace." 95 In
another statement that qualifies the harassment as a cultural myth, the Court
wrote, "'Everyone knows by now that sexual harassment is a common problem
in the American workplace.' ... An employer can, in a general sense, reasonably
anticipate the possibility of such conduct occurring in its workplace .... ,,96
When a practice is "well recognized," one that "everyone knows by now"
and one that "an employer can reasonably anticipate"--the practice is a custom
and a tradition, a functioning myth in the culture. Sexual harassment functions
on a belief that women in the workplace belong elsewhere. This value
perpetuates itself as institutionalized tradition-a myth.
93 See Part IV of this Commentary for a discussion of whether any of the bargaining
discussion is rational, or whether the discussion is simply an ongoing effort to reach an
agreement that fits within the schematic of norms and customs (i.e., myth).
94 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
95 Id. at 798.
96 Id. (quoting Jansen v. Packaging Corp. of Am., 123 F.3d 490, 511 (7th Cir. 1997)).
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A myriad of possible standards and norms exist in the workplace concerning
the sexuality of both women and men. Norms will vary according to
geographical location and according to industry-specific traditions giving rise to
power issues between employees. Stakes concerning money or reputation can be
high for an employer.97 Perceived power based on conflicting values about
women in the workplace, or men working in a traditionally female workplace,
will be the determinative element on whether sexual harassment did or did not
occur.
Power is one of the myths in sexual harassment cases that mediators must
grapple with in attempting to bring the parties to a resolution. 98 Esteem for
women in the workplace empowers women, but a lack of esteem, which is
demonstrated through harassment, disempowers women. Serving "as a rhetorical
medium to command at least minimal consensus and minimal reciprocal
recognition among members of the community,"99 values in an idealized posture
aid parties in feeling that their positions are well-grounded. These rhetorical
resources are evident as consensus and spectrums that overlap and in mediation
can be used by the mediator to move the parties to a settlement range. In sexual
harassment mediation, the mediator must utilize minimal consensus that
another's sexuality is not available for demands as quid pro quo for work.
The Supreme Court's decision in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson100
brought demands for sex to the forefront as a power issue and raised another
issue-whether hostile working environments create a cause of action for sexual
harassment. Although the employee, Vinson, was performing her assigned job
tasks in an acceptable manner, she testified that she thought she would lose her
job if she did not give in to her supervisor's sexual demands. 101 The bank
manager used the power of his position to coerce the employee into
acquiescence.10 2 Sexual harassment litigation arises out of conflicting values on
the right to be in the workplace without suffering through sexual demands. The
challenge to the "everyone knows" myth is a contention for a new myth and a
workplace paradigm shift. Sexual harassment litigation vividly captures the
concept of abstract formulation and the value of gender equality rights in conflict
with fact driven, pragmatic decisions remedying a rights violation. Women in the
97 
Id. at 798.
98 For a discussion of the concept of power and its relation to sexual harassment, see
generally CATHERINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN: A CASE
OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).
9 9 SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 45.
100 Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
101 Id. at 60.
102 See id.
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workplace cause fellow workers to come face-to-face with their values and how
these values fit with long-standing customs and traditions-myth about "a
woman's place." The battle of conflicting myths, gender equality, and power
occurs in each allegation of sexual harassment. The situation is even more
prevalent in mediation because the parties are working to reach some self-
determined resolution, and their normative precommitment 103 will have already
assumed a position at the conference table.
The Meritor decision began a sequence of cases decided by the Court on
hostile environment sexual harassment law. The language in Meritor set out a
standard for identifying hostile working environments due to sexual
harassment. 104 The Meritor opinion is written in such a way as to possibly lead a
lawyer to conclude that a plaintiff must prove: (1) the "practice of creating a
working environment 'heavily charged"' 1 05 with actions or words that harassed
sexually; and (2) "a working environment so heavily polluted with discrimination
as to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of minority
group workers .... "106
In Meritor, the working environment for the plaintiff was heavily polluted
with sexual harassment, so the opinion could easily define heavy pollution. 07
But, the language, "heavily charged,"'1 8 could easily be taken as the litmus test
for determining whether sexual harassment occurred. Not suprisingly, the
Meritor language concerning destruction of emotional and psychological stability
was relied on by the defendant in the next case to reach the Court on the issue of
a hostile working environment.
The case of Harris v. Forklift Systems 109 followed Meritor for decision by
the Court. At its outset, the Harris decision tells us that in order for a claim to be
actionable under Title VII, the environment must be one that is objectively
hostile, which invokes the reasonable person standard. 10 "Conduct that is not
severe or pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work
environment-an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive-is beyond Title VII's purview."11' Objectively hostile or abusive
cannot be proven if the language or action cannot be reasonably perceived as
103 See generally Winter, An Upside Down View, supra note 4, at 188 1.
104 Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65-69.
105 Id. at 66 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (1971)).
10 6 Id. (quoting Rogers, 454 F.2d at 238).
107 See generally id., 477 U.S. at 57.
108 See generally id.
109 Harris v. Forklift Sys., 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
1 10 Id. at 21.
111 1d.
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disempowering the complaining employee. 112 Thus, it would require an
extraordinary fact pattern for a supervisor to claim sexual harassment by an
employee who the supervisor has "power over." Theoretically, if one has "power
over" another employee, the supervising employee can simply fire the employee
attempting harassment. With this latter statement the Harris decision begins to
establish parameters that were not established in Meritor. Also, the Harris
decision established parameters that strengthened the hand of a mediator in
dealing with sexual harassment litigation.' '3 Knowing what Meritor established
as precedent and in hindsight, what the Harris decision held, the next section is
devoted to a possible mediation of Harris.
C. A Mediation of Harris
How might the mediation of Harris have proceeded? What would have been
the likely arguments of each party? Clearly Forklift would have started at the
same point the defendant started at the trial court-with a reading of Meritor as
requiring conduct that "seriously affected plaintiff's psychological well-being or
led her to suffer emotional injury."' 1 4 Harris did not claim that either of these
injuries existed. Briefly stated, the facts that would have been presented to a
mediator are the following:
Harris, a female, sued Forklift Systems, Inc. claiming that the conduct of
Hardy, Forklift's president, toward her constituted sexual harassment in the form
112Id. at 21-22.
113 These are the three parameters set out in Harris:
[1] A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously
affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from employees'
job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job, or keep them from
advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard to these tangible effects, the
very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so severe or pervasive that it created a
work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or
national origin offends Title VII's broad rule of workplace equality [;] [2] The
appalling conduct alleged in Meritor, and the reference in that case to environments 'so
heavily polluted with discrimination as to destroy completely the emotional and
psychological stability of minority group workers' merely present some especially
egregious examples of harassment. They do not mark the boundary of what is
actionable[; and] ...
[3] Certainly Title VII bars conduct that would seriously affect a reasonable
person's psychological well-being, but the statute is not limited to such conduct. So
long as the environment would reasonably be perceived, and is perceived, as hostile or
abusive .... there is no need forit also to be psychologically injurious."
Harris, 510 U.S. at 22 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67).
114 Id.
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of an abusive work environment. 1 5 Harris worked as a manager at Forklift
Systems, an equipment rental company, from April 1985 until October 1987, for
a total of two years and five months.
[T]hroughout Harris' time at Forklift, Hardy often insulted her because of her
gender and often made her the target of unwanted sexual innuendos. Hardy told
Harris on several occasions, in the presence of other employees, "You're a
woman, what do you know" and "We need a man as the rental manager;" at
least once, he told her she was a dumb ass woman. Again in front of others, he
suggested that the two of them "go to the Holiday Inn to negotiate [Harris']
raise ....
In mid-August 1987, Harris complained to Hardy about his conduct. Hardy
said he was surprised that Harris was offended, claimed he was only joking and
apologized. He also promised he would stop, and based on this assurance
Harris stayed on the job. But in early September, Hardy began anew. While
Harris was arranging a deal with one of Forklift's customers, he asked her,
again in front of other employees, "What did you do, promise the guy some
[sex] Saturday night?" On October 1, Harris collected her paycheck and
quit. 116
Were the statements just good-natured joking (i.e., normal work horseplay in
the equipment rental business)? The president's remark that the company needed
a man as rental manager and that she was "a dumb ass woman"1 17 clearly
portrays a bias against women in workplace management positions. When the
employee spoke out against the president's remarks, he declared he was "only
joking and apologized."' 1 8 He also promised he would stop, but did not.1 19 The
absence of a cessation in the remarks forecloses good-natured joking as a
defense.
The facts in Harris are excellent for the purposes of this Commentary. They
display the myths earlier stated as present in sexual harassment litigation,
sexuality, power, and workplace availability.'
20





120 The sexuality myth is that sexuality is always present when both men and women
are present. The power myth is one in which the sexual harasser always believes him or
herself to be in a position of power that allows for the demand of sexual favors or to make
sexual remarks that must be suffered through. The workplace myth is an old and very tired
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The trial judge agreed with the Forklift position. With an activist
judgetype 121 such as earlier discussed 122 Harris would have come under
considerable pressure to reach a settlement for much less relief, if any, than a
plaintiff would expect after the Supreme Court's decision in Harris. Not until
the decision in Harris was there an enunciated standard that "Title VII comes
into play before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown." 123 The
Harris decision established an anchor standard addressed by Shell and discussed
in Part II.B of this article.12 4 It is likely that the Harris Court would have started
with the position that the MeNtor requirements were met because Forklift's
conduct was "so severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive
to employees."
125
This case would have been tough for the mediator-tough, but not
impossible. The task would have been tough because Meritor was controlling
law, the "shadow of the law". 126 Therefore, stakes were high because a win for
either party before the Supreme Court would either shift jurisprudence enough to
cause an employer paradigm shift in favor of employees, or could continue a
"don't bother with the situation" attitude. The outcome expectation of each party
would have been pivotal in mediation. 127 Because of Meritor, Forklift believed
that its position was the one supported by precedent, and therefore, not
assailable. 128 At the same time, Harris was convinced that she could prevail
based on a hostile work environment without having had to suffer psychological
or emotional injury.1
29
Without benefit of the Harris decision, Harris would have had to assume the
posture in mediation that ultimately became the Supreme Court's decision in
Harris.
myth that we have all heard: women have no place in the workplace. A woman's place is in
the kitchen and in the bedroom.
121 Lederman, supra note 24, at 335-36.
122 See infra Part IV.A.
12 3 Harris, 510 U.S. at 17,22.
124 SHELL, supra note 26, at 49.
12 5 Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23.
12 6 See Mnookin & Komhauser, supra note 33, at 951 (examining "how rules and
procedures used in courts for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that occurs
between [parties] outside the courtroom").
12 7 See Lederman, supra note 24, at 333-34, 341 (noting that higher stakes cases and
cases in which the parties have divergent expectations are more difficult to settle).
12 8 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 22-23.
129 See id.
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A discriminatorily abusive work environment, even one that does not seriously
affect employees' psychological well-being, can and often will detract from
employees' job performance, discourage employees from remaining on the job,
or keep them from advancing in their careers. Moreover, even without regard
to these tangible effects, the very fact that the discriminatory conduct was so
severe or pervasive that it created a work environment abusive to employees
because of their race, gender, religion, or national origin offends Title VII's
broad rule of workplace equality.130
This position, however, had not been enunciated and Meritor's language,
which included terms such as "heavily charged" and "a work environment
destructive of emotional and psychological stability", would have controlled with
the power of persuasion had there been an ongoing mediation of Harris.
A mediation of Harris would most likely include, in addition to Harris and a
Forklift representative, two attorneys, for a minimum total of four individuals.
The bargaining, therefore, would have to frame a minimum of four cultural
norms and standards concerning sexuality, power, and the workplace. These are
spicy ingredients for a working mediation environment. Ultimately, a confluence
of the four sets of standards must occur in order for the parties to reach a
settlement. Out of such a confluence, the mediator must facilitate the origination
of a value spectrum to produce the spectrum of overlap discussed in Part II of
this Commentary-the settlement range. 131 Harris makes a novel case to study
for possible mediation results because the factual situation did not have a deeply
entrenched "shadow of the law" hanging over the table to enhance bargaining
chips held by Harris or Forklift. In mediation, the parties would each attempt to
persuade the mediator that precedent favored their position, while the mediator
would attempt to persuade the parties that their position was assailable. We now
know that the Harris position was the one chosen by the Court. A mediator
would have been a valuable resource for these two parties, especially Forklift, in
shaping outcome expectations and ultimately, a self-determined resolution.
The measure of harassment required for a favorable plaintiffs finding
depends on a specific culture's beliefs and norms-myth about behavioral
expectations in the workplace that vary from one workplace to another. Because
a trier of fact will be asked to look objectively at the work environment and make
a decision about whether the plaintiff's perception of the behavior as offensive
was reasonable, the reasonable person doctrine (more likely the reasonable
woman standard) will be invoked to examine the culture and norms of the
130 Id. at 22.
131 SHELL, supra note 26, at 49-51.
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relevant community.132 The culture and norms will be based on myth. Once the
culture and time of the conduct have been identified, the question of whether the
conduct created a hostile working environment is answered by examining what
the norms permit. 133 The power to tilt the bargaining table in one's favor cannot
be verbalized as a standard that is universal in scope because the norms and
standards will vary from culture to culture.
The Harris decision uses language that, for the purposes of mediation,
creates soft boundaries for a settlement range and could be said to weaken
outcome expectations for either party. The following language from Harris,
whereby the Court intentionally and specifically looks to normative culture, is
broad enough to establish a settlement range within which the parties can agree.
[W]hether an environment is "hostile" or "abusive" can be determined only by
looking at all the circumstances. These may include the frequency of the
discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or
humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably
interferes with an employee's work performance. The effect on the employee's
psychological well-being is, of course, relevant to determining whether the
plaintiff actually found the environment abusive. But while psychological
harm, like any other relevant factor, may be taken into account, no single factor
is required. 134
By advising us that a mathematically precise test does not exist,135 and by its
subsequently delineating factors to be considered, 136 we are clearly thrust by the
Supreme Court into common law fact-finding and the myths under which we all
live. Only through self-interpretation of our inner selves in relation to the outside
world can it be determined whether a remark was humiliating and qualifies as
132 The trial court in Harris applied a reasonable person test, and the Supreme Court did
not explicity adopt or reject this standard. Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pragmatic Supportfor
the Reasonable Victim Standard in Hostile Workplace Sexual Harrassment Cases, 5 PSYCH.
PUB. POL. & L. 519, 529 (1999). While the Supreme Court in Harris used the "reasonable
person" standard, the language in the opinion "implied that a gender-specific test was
approved or required." Id. at 536.
133 See generally Janet Sigal & Heidi Jacobsen, A Cross-Cultural Exploration of
Factors Affecting Reactions to Sexual Harassment: Attitudes and Policies, 5 PSYCH. PUB.
POL. & L. 760 (1999) (exploring the relationship between attitudes towards women and the
development ofpolicies prohibiting sexual harassment); Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex
Roles, Work and Taxing Women, 44 VILL. L. REV. 495 (1999) (discussing the impact of sex
role norms or customs on women).
134 Harris, 510 U.S. at 23.
135 Id. at 22-23.
13 6 Id.
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sexual harassment or whether it was a mere offensive utterance which does not
so qualify. Mediation would be particularly helpful in resolving the
interpretations and perception or myths of party conduct in the sexual harassment
context. By discussing with each party the underlying values of the acts at issue,
mediation enables an ongoing discussion that reveals the paradigm shift our
culture has undergone with respect to the older myths about a woman's place in
the workplace, and it also enables discussion regarding whether the conduct
would be reasonable in the new paradigm culture. A mediator making each of
these points would gradually enable the attorneys to see through the lens of the
other party-a mediation goal that this article has emphasized.
If the parties agree on a settlement that is within the spongy boundaries of
the operative myth, 137 the trial judge will almost certainly approve the settlement
as the order of the court even though the judge does not personally agree with the
settlement. 138 The inherently vague statutory language Justice Scalia speaks to in
137 In the Harris decision, the concurring opinion of Justice Scalia bemoans the absence
of a clear standard for the bench and practicing bar. Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J.,
concurring). The statutory language at issue in Harris, "abusive work environment", is
inherently vague because of the necessary evidentiary proof concerning the impairment of
working conditions. Id. at 21-23. One can easily see that evidence might well vary from
location to location, and from workplace to workplace. The necessary proofwill be found in
location-specific employment, or specific culture. Evidentiary proof of the culture's
expectation is evidentiary proof of its myth. For the same reason, the Supreme Court's
decision lacks certitude.
138 For this reason, some observers of the mediation process maintain that cases that
involve issues of sufficient public interest ought not be allowed to settle according to the
interests of the private parties of the litigation without intervention of a public trial. See
STONE, supra note 20, at 22 (excerpting articles written by skeptics of ADR. One of these
articles, written by Judge Harry T. Edwards, argues that ADR is not appropriate for
constitutional issues or issues of great public concern. HarryT. Edwards, AlternativeDispute
Resolution: Panacea orAnathema?, 99 HARV. L. REv. 668 (1986) in STONE, supra note 20,
at 22-25 ("if ADR is extended to resolve difficult issues of constitutional or public
law.., there is real reason for concern. An oft-forgotten virtue of adjudication is that it
ensures the proper resolution and application of public values.")). Judge Edwards also noted
that
[i]nexpensive, expeditious, and informal adjudication is not always synonymous with
fair and just adjudication. The decision makers may not understand the values at stake
and parties to disputes do not always possess equal power and resources. Sometimes
because of this inequality and sometimes because of deficiencies in informal processes
lacking procedural protections, the use of alternative mechanisms will produce nothing
more than inexpensive and ill-informed decisions. And these decisions may merely
legitimate decisions made by the existing power structure within society. Additionally,
by diverting particular types of cases away from adjudication, we may stifle the
development of law in certain disfavored areas of law. Imagine, for example, the
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his concurring opinion 139 inherently creates space for mediation. Given a good
faith questioning of liability, outcome expectations may greatly differ.
Considering the discussion on outcome expectations and stakes in this article, if
the parties cannot be brought to see the case through the lens of the other
party,140 and their outcome expectations greatly diverge, 141 the case will not
settle. Reliance on a reasonable person test serves up fodder for litigation. The
parties in sexual harassment litigation can hold myth expectations that give rise
to divergent outcome expectations.142
Harris would have needed leverage-some fact or circumstance that would
have made a sufficient impact on Forklift and provided the mediator with
discussion points helpful to Harris. If Forklift assumed an intractable stance in
mediation, the likelihood of a settlement would have been slight to none because
of Meritor. The same can be said if Harris assumed an intractable competitive
stance in mediation. Prior to the Harris decision, Meritor allowed the parties to
assume a competitive stance by choosing to read the case in a way most
favorable to their respective positions. Thus, there would have been no
settlement. But, it is also possible that each party could have assumed a
cooperative stance by reading Meritor for the case it was-a framework that
shapes the parameter of rights in a case involving a hostile work environment
and leaves the facts to determine the remedy. If Harris and Forklift assumed a
cooperative stance, the case might well have settled.
We now know that the Harris position was chosen by the Court when it
further established the criteria necessary to prevail in an action alleging a hostile
work environment. A mediator would have been a valuable resource for these
two parties, especially Forklift, in shaping outcome expectations and ultimately,
a self-determined resolution.
Thus the litigation would not have proceeded to the Supreme Court and
employer and employee court watchers would have had to await some other
impoverished nature of civil rights law that would have resulted had all race
discrimination cases in the sixties and seventies been mediated rather than adjudicated.
The wholesale diversion of cases involving the legal rights of the poor may result in the
definition of these rights by the powerful in our society rather than by the application of
fundamental societal values reflected in the rule of law.
Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99 HARv.
L. REv. 668, 679 (1986).
139 See Harris, 510 U.S. at 24 (Scalia, J., concurring).
140 SHELL, supra note 26, at 78 ("Research suggests that the ability to understand your
bargaining opponent's perspective may be the most critical of these skills and one of the
hardest to use in practice.").
141 Lederman, supra note 24, at 333-34.
142 Id.
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litigation with a fact pattern that allowed the Court to clarify Meritor. A settled
Harris v. Forklift is a case that public-interest court observers would urge as the
type that ought not be left to settle according to private-party interests. 143
According to the Smith and Weisstub concept that myth is the mother of
law,144 myth provides a commonality upon which a minimum of three persons in
the mediation conference room can draw. The three-two lawyers and the
mediator who is likely to be a lawyer-will embrace myth garbed in law's robes
as a frame of reference to form the needed spectrum of overlap for a settlement
range. "In one sense, the law's dominion and control is extended through a
process of strategic compliance. This entails both the conscious and unconscious
inscription of law's metaphors, categories and concepts within the institutions
and within the agents subject to law."' 145 It is this conscious and unconscious
inscription of the law that moves into the mediation conference room with the
parties. Bargaining provides a vehicle for the strategic compliance sought by
parties in mediation, and it is in this strategic compliance that Shell's consistency
web theory 146 yields what he calls normative leverage.147 "There are too many
situational and personal variables for a single strategy to work in all cases." 148
These personal variables make for the relatively autonomous self that Schlag
writes about. 149 The following description by Schlag of his relatively
autonomous self construct sounds much like a party in mediation seeking an
overlap in consensus and, therefore, a settlement range that satisfies the party's
existing and deeply embedded cultural myths.
Of course the relatively autonomous self (as its name indicates) is not
entirely stable. Being only relatively autonomous, it is constantly called upon to
adjudicate the boundaries of its own autonomy.... This constant
struggle... can lead, the relatively autonomous self to ask itself some strange
questions. It can ask, for instance, how it knows what is is doing. The answer is
that the self doesn't really know what it is doing, because it is embedded in
interpretive constructs that it cannot know about. It just sort of groks its way
through life ....
143 See discussion infra Part II.B.
144 THE WESTERN IDEA OF LAW, supra note 59, at 120.
145 SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 150.
146 SHELL, supra note 26, at 42-43.
147 "Normative leverage is the skillful use of standards, norms, and coherent positioning
to gain advantage or protect a position. You maximize your normative leverage when the
standards, norms, and themes you assert are ones the other party views as legitimate and
relevant to the resolution ofyour differences." Id. at 43.
148 SHELL, supra note 26, at xii.
149 SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 3, at 98-99, 103-04.
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Having admitted that it cannot know what it is doing, the relatively
autonomous self might begin to wonder just what it is that keeps it together as a
unified, more or less stable and generally continuous entity throughout the day.
The answer is that the relatively autonomous self is kept whole by a meaning
structure which, of course, is always embedded in interpretive communities.
150
Schlag's description shows clearly that the self will lean heavily on customs
and traditions that operate as major persuaders. Shell speaks of "range finding"
standards and in so doing spotlights the self as a party who is relatively
autonomous.
Institutionalized standards aside, most norms in market negotiations are
contestable. These are the range-finding standards. They provide a basis for
arguing in a civilized way about preferred results, but they do not dictate what
the final agreement will be. They legitimize offers and demands and narrow the'
range within which bargaining will take place.
151
Shell's social roles,152 Winter's constitutive ","1153 and Schlag's autonomous
self,154 each live and relate to others according to their embedded life-defining
values-their myths.
V. CONCLUSION
Myths begin as ideological constructs that bring harmony and organization to
situations of potential chaos and conflict. Piece-by-piece the constructs grow into
full-blown space, time, and location-specific cultural myths of custom and
tradition as persons seek parameters for appropriate behavior. In its relationship
to law, myth forms the basis of a culture's beliefs and values. Over extended
periods of time, the myth-spawned values become institutionalized as codified
legislation and common law case precedent-the law of the land. This
commentary goes beyond a recognition that norms commit us to a path that is
always relative. Exploration of myth and its spawnings takes us, I believe, to the
primal level of American jurisprudence. Myth, I claim, accounts for the
generative history of our values, and answers the question: Where does the
original source of the constitutive 'T' lie? Shlag discounts attempts to reduce our
cultural values to their generative history by referring to these attempts as
150 Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
151 SHELL, supra note 26, at 50.
152 Id. at 53.
153 Winter, On Building Houses, supra note 4, at 1610.
154 SCHLAG, LAYING DowN THE LAW supra note 3, at 98-99, 103-04.
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"rhetoric of a romanticized past" and "authorial moments." 155 What is missing,
he says, is "any historical recollection of how these particular values came to be
values for us, individually and collectively."'
156
Myth built upon custom, tradition and the generation of values has shifted
and changed, if only in two areas, for black America and women. Most black
Americans and women would argue that these shifts and changes are not enough.
Maybe not. The ultimate issue of sufficiency is, however, not the subject of this
Commentary. I intended only to demonstrate that myth constitutes the roots of
our culture and thereby shapes and molds our law. Myth has, in the year 2000,
moved us to a jurisprudence that is not altogether a white man in a black robe.
Therefore, our jurisprudence experienced a paradigm shift that brought with it
some shift in cultural power. As customs and traditions shift, so do our myths.
When we hit a critical mass, another subtle shift occurs. When all those in
workplace environments understand that a power shift has occurred, which
allows for women in the workplace to go about work free of sexual innuendo,
advances, and demands, a different myth will have taken hold spawning different
value systems.
Parties and lawyers alike are likely to parrot "the normative jurisprudential
world, built of arguments upon arguments upon arguments-just hanging there
on the threads of normative structures marked out with concepts like fairness,
consent, oppression, neutrality, and policed by aesthetic criteria like coherence,
consistency, certainty, elegance"'157 and other abstract values that mirror myth.
Each of these terms requires definition. Through that definition, parties may
bring forth their foundational myths.
Normative structures-myth, and tribal customs-remain important because
they are performatively effective. 158 Normative values "are institutionally and
cognitively embedded. '159 So much are our life defining values institutionally
and cognitively embedded that we sense and instinctively espouse "some of the
key political, ethical, and aesthetic values of contemporary American law" 160
because we have grown up hearing of their value in context-laden situations.
These values include the following: "Justice, goodness, rightness, truth, fairness,
efficiency, order, progress, freedom, equality, security, tolerance, neutrality,
community .... " 161
155 Id. at 44.
156 Id. at 43.
157 Id. at 30-31.
158 See id. at 31-33.
159 Id. at 40.
160 Id. at 43.
161 Id.
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Lamenting the separation of values from their root origin, Schlag recounts:
"[T]hroughout all these various uses of values, there is one thing that is not much
talked about: the action of valuation, the generative history of values. What is
missing is any historical recollection of how these particular values came to be
values for us, individually and collectively."' 162 The language that Schlag scripts
as language of legal thinkers becomes the language of the lawyer and client in
mediation.
Parties often state that "justice requires" or "equality requires" a specific
result. In this kind of rhetoric, values become the self-evident starting points and
grounds of legal conversations. In this jurisprudential world, it is at once
impossible and beside the point to ask about the generative history of value or
values. It is impossible because values are taken to be self-evidently self-
grounding and it is presumed that participants in the legal conversation already
take values to be the primary source of authority."'163
Schlag writes disdainfully of what he terms the "rhetoric of the romanticized
past."
[T]he rhetoric of the romanticized past, [occurs when] the generative history of
values is supplanted by a mythic and highly idealized rendition of the authorial
moment-the moment at which values become accepted as values. In this
rhetoric, generative history is reduced to discrete authorial moments. For
instance, the authoring of values in American law is ascribed to mystical
foundational moments (e.g., "1789"), to venerated authoritative texts (e.g.,
"The Constitution"), to politically revered authors (e.g., "The Framers"), or to
the sophisticated constructions of moral and political philosophy .... 164
I am not disdainful of a generative history that speaks to authorial moments.
Instead, I think that authorial moments are the ideological constructs I
commented on earlier in this work. Authorial moments explain exactly how our
values come to be. These authorial moments and our derived values arrive on the
scene in smaller, more discrete components than Schlag references. I absolutely
agree with Schlag when he says, "Values are context-transcendent to the extent
that they enable judgment or evaluation in a variety of different situations and
circumstances. The abstract character of values establishes the possibility of
context-transcendence, while the idealized character of values legitimates
abstraction from the concrete specifics of particular contexts." 165 There is
however, a layer deeper than values to be reckoned with. Because values lie
162 Id.
163 Id. at 43-44.
164 Id. at 44.
165 Id. at 45.
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embedded in myth as custom and tradition, it is the myths that are context
transcendent.
The generative history 166 of values is myth. It is the myths that are
institutionally and cognitively embedded and police the black-robed judges. The
judges cannot unshackle themselves. Myths built piece-by-piece, situation by
situation, hold the response to Schlag's lament about the severance of values
from their generative history.
It may simply be impossible to have "any historical recollection of how
these particular values came to be values for us, individually and collectively."'
167
Values evolve as the situational story grows and multiplies. Look at my example
of the civil rights movement. An argument concerning a seat on the bus led to
sit-ins, which led to murders and eventually the taking down of "white" and
"colored" signs above water fountains. Today the myth is racial equality.
Unlike the bus seat incident that is so well documented, no one person may
know or remember the first situational story that required the culture to shift and
change its verbaliz:ed value. We can conclude, however, that myths provide
checks and balances to absolute authority and unbridled power. Judges,
including white men in black robes, live their myths as we live ours. As our
collective societal paradigms evolve and shift, our own myths along with those of
the judges upon which we rely, evolve and shift, even if at first only understood
at some subtle conscious, almost unconscious level.
After all, "[t]he self knows that interpretation is a social practice and that
there will always be something about practice that cannot be reduced to rules,
theory, or reason." 168 This something to which Schlag refers is, for me, myth so
deeply, thoroughly, institutionally, and cognitively embedded that a settlement in
mediation is reached only when the parties come face-to-face with their
fundamental myths in the normative language of the other party.
166 Id. at 43.
167 Id.
168 Id. at 98.
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